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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STAh

»
Case No. 980099-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Priority No. 2
DONALD WILLIAM YORK,
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the trial court's denial of defendai.l
withdraw

sot yuilty pleo

.1. li 1.1

^ degree murder, a first degree

felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1979); and one count of attempted
manslaughter, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205
(1975). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Anr

8-2a-3(2)(j)

(1996).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court properly refuse to address issues that

defendant previously litigated in state post-convicuu:

1

^eedings?

2.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that defendant's trial counsel

was constitutionally effective?
3.

Does the record as a whole demonstrate that defendant pled

guilty with full knowledge and understanding of the consequences and of the rights
he was waiving?
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
This Court reviews a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty
plea under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Stilling. 856 P.2d 666, 670
(Utah App. 1993). Accord State v. Blair. 868 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993) (citations
omitted). An abuse of discretion is a determination that the trial court acted beyond
the bounds of reasonability. State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993).
Furthermore, the trial court's "findings of fact which lead to its ultimate decision will
not be 'set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.'" Stilling. 856 P.2d at 870
(quoting State v. Gardner. 844 P.2d 293, 295 (Utah 1992)).
Since defendant entered his plea prior to the Utah Supreme Court's
decision in State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), the strict compliance
standard of Gibbons does not apply. See Stilling. 856 P.2d at 671; Blair. 868 P.2d
at 805. Instead, this Court will uphold a decision denying a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea if "the record as a whole affirmatively establishes that the defendant
entered his plea with full knowledge and understanding of its consequences and of
2

the rights he was waiving." Blair. 868 P.2d at 806 (citations omitted). Accord State
v. Gardner. 844

992).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
The text of any relevant constitutional provisions, statutes or rules is
contained in the body of this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In June 1984, defendant was charged in the Second Judicial District
Court, Davis County, with first degree murder, a capital offense, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1984); attempted second degict
lili HI/

hi

I III ill f nde Ann. §§ 76-5-203 M979\ 76-4-102 (1983); and

aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203
(1973) (York v. Shulsen. 875 P.2d 590 (Utah App. 1994); Addendum A). Pursuant
to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to the amended charges ul sei
degree murder, n In I Jwjii.v li I N , m violation

I

I Ul, id ' o d e Ann. § 76-5-203

(1979); and attempted manslaughter, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1975) (R. 50-51, 55-57). The State agreed to recommend
concurrent sentences and to forego seeking a firearm enhanceme
sentenced defendant

ears-to-life for second degree murder and to

3

a consecutive term of zero-to-five years for attempted manslaughter (York, 875 P.2d
at 593; Addendum A).
Defendant unsuccessfully sought state post-conviction and federal
habeas relief (R. 103-07). In August 1996, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his
guilty pleas (R. 64-87).

After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied

defendant's request (R.325-335; Addendum B). Defendant timely appealed (R.
338).

STATEMENT OF FACTS1
The Shootings
On June 17, 1984, defendant purchased with cash an airline ticket to
fly from California to Salt Lake City under the false name of Dan Hill (York. 875 P.2d
at 592; Addendum A) (R. 326; Addendum B). After his arrival in Salt Lake City later
that day, defendant rented a car using his true name, Donald York (id.). Thereafter,
defendant drove to the home of his ex-wife, Patricia York. Armed with a loaded gun,
defendant entered his ex-wife's home, went to Ms. York's bedroom, and fired twelve

defendant recites the facts in the light most favorable to him, which is
contrary to the trial court's findings. See Brief of App. at 5-9. Appellee
appropriately recites the facts in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings.
See Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill. 849 P.2d 602, 603 (Utah App. 1993) (citing
State v. Moosman. 794 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah 1990)).
4

to fourteen shots, seriously wounding Ms. York and killing her boyfriend, Jeff
Long hurst (|<±).
Defendant's Surrender
if

I

«ndar

rrendered himself to

Bountiful police (York. 875 P.2d at 892; Addendum A). Defendant told the police
dispatcher, "I'm the man you want... I'm the one that did the shooting" (Preliminary
Hearing Transcript [hereinafter P.H. Tr.] at 73-74). Defendant told the officers that
there

,

•

id asked whether Ms YoiK ,iiid MI

Longhurst were alive (York. 875 P.2d at 892; Addendum A). Defendant also told the
police where to find the gun and shells, and stated he was going to hell and could
no longer be a member of his church because of what he had done (id.).
Competency/Sanity Examinations Ordered
Shortly after the State charged defendant with the shootings, defendant
filed a notice of insanity defense pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-3 (1983) (R.
25-26).

The trial court then appointed two mental health experts to examine

defendant's mental condition as require
Roth experts opined that defendant was not mentally ill. Specifically, Dr.
Ghicadus, a psychiatrist employed by the Davis County Mental Health Center,
concluded that defendant was "not 'insane' in a legal sense of the word, is not
psychotic in a psychiatric sense, but [had] variances and neurotic traits that [dia
5

seriously interfere with one's everyday life" (R. 126-126a).2 Dr. Ghicadus further
concluded that defendant "[was] mentally competent to understand trial proceedings
and would be able to assist in his defense" (R. 126). Dr. Ghicadus noted that the
source of defendant's alleged amnesia3 could not be determined without conducting
a "complete neurologic examination" (id). 4 He further stated that defendant's claim
of amnesia, for which there was no documented history, made it virtually impossible
to retrospectively assess defendant's state of mind at the time of the crime (R. 126).
Dr. Kimball, a psychologist employed by the Davis County Mental
Health Center, similarly found "no signs of any psychoses, illogical thinking,
delusions or hallucinations" (R. 131a). He further noted that defendant's "train of
thought appears to be normal," and that defendant's mental status exam was normal
except for anxiety and a reduced ability to concentrate (id). Dr. Kimball opined that
defendant was able to recognize right from wrong and that there was no medical
evidence of a dissociative state that would reduce defendant's capacity to control his
impulses (R. 132). Dr. Kimball also stated that validity indicators on written tests

2

The doctors' reports are two-sided, however, the trial court did not record
paginate the second side of the page. Therefore, appellee has simply designated
the blank pages with an "a" (e.g. R. 126a, 1 2 7 a , . . . etc.).
defendant told the doctors that he lacked any memory of the shootings.
defendant incorrectly asserts that Dr. Ghicadus and Dr. Kimball
"requested" additional testing. Compare Brief of App. at 4 with R. 126, 129.
6

indicated that defendant was "faking bad and faking sick" (I

Kimball

character:ITI rlrti'iirhiil' 1 , i LHIIUMI .IIIIIII'SM ,r, "lipjiiviy," noting that defendant's
"memory before the incident was good and his memory after the incident is good"
(kl). However, because there was some evidence that defendant had "a couple of
accidents where there was some brain injury supposedly [sic]," the doctor also noted
"further examination [wasj m UIL

;

*'[m]ost likely the findings [would] be negative as far as finding any real organic
pathology" (icL).
Guilty Pleas
jctober
degre

inn

degree

jefendant
feinm

violation ~* Jtah Code Ann. § 76-5-203

(1979); and attempted manslaughter, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-205 (1975) (R. 55-6, 139-145a). During the plea colloquy, the court
clerk handed a copy of the amended information to defendant and read u
Although defendant claimed that he had no memory
of the shootings, he agreed with his trial counsel's assessment that if the matter had
gone to trial, the facts probably would have lead to a first or second degree murder
conviction, and for that reason, defendant desired to plead gui
Defendant admitted that he was "very much so" satisfied with counsel's advice and
representation (R. 141a, 142a). Defendant agreed that he was pleading guilty
7

because he believed that he "in fact engaged in the conduct," and because he
wanted to "get this over with" (R. 143-44). The trial court explained that by pleading
guilty, defendant was waiving his right to a jury trial, his right to call witnesses and
to require the State to call witnesses, and his right to force the State to prove each
element beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury of defendant's peers (R. 142). The trial
court advised defendant of the possible maximum sentences for each charge, and
informed defendant that the court was not bound by any sentencing
recommendations (R. 141a, 142a). At the conclusion of the plea colloquy, the trial
court found that defendant knowingly pled guilty to both counts of the amended
information (R. 144).
Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) Diagnosis 5
After defendant was incarcerated at the Utah State Prison, Dr. Carlisle,
the prison psychiatrist, conducted several hypnosis/therapy sessions with defendant
in 1985 and ultimately diagnosed defendant as having MPD (R. 182-92) (York. 875
P.2d at 593; Addendum A). Based upon the MPD diagnosis, defendant sought postconviction relief (R. 147-157).

5

The MPD diagnosis is not pertinent to the issues presented in this appeal.
However, it is relevant to the district court's refusal to re-examine the issue of
defendant's competency, and will provide this Court with an understanding of
prior proceedings. Although MPD is currently referred to as Dissociative Identity
Disorder ("DID"), at the time Dr. Carlisle diagnosed defendant, the disorder was still
known as MPD. Therefore, appellee uses the term MPD throughout its brief.
8

At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Dr. Carlisle testified that even
though defendant likely had MPD at the time of the shootings, defendant would have
been capable of rational thought and could have formed the intent to kill, as well as
understood the nature of his crimes (R. 182-92) (York. 875 P.2d at 593; Addendum
A).

Dr. Carlisle also stressed that defendant would have been capable of

understanding court proceedings and assisting his attorney (id). For these reasons,
Dr. Carlisle concluded defendant was competent when he pled guilty to the
shootings (\±). Defendant's witness, Dr. Alan E. Jeppsen, agreed with Dr. Carlisle's
MPD diagnosis, but disagreed that defendant was competent to enter the guilty
pleas (R. 194)(York, 875 P.2d at 593; Addendum A).
State Post-Conviction Court's Ruling
On July 16, 1991, upon consideration of the evidence, including the
initial police reports, the written evaluations of Doctors Ghicadus and Kimball, the
testimony of Doctors Carlisle and Jeppsen, and the transcripts of defendant's plea
colloquy, the state post-conviction court denied defendant's request for postconviction relief (R. 203-04). The post-conviction court concluded that defendant
was competent when he pled guilty on October 29, 1984 (id). The court further
concluded that the trial court properly accepted defendant's guilty pleas to the crimes
defendant claimed to have no memory of, but was willing to plead to in exchange for
a favorable plea bargain (jd).
9

State Post-Conviction Appeal
On appeal from the denial of state post-conviction relief, this Court held
that the trial did not err by failing to hold a competency hearing prior to accepting
defendant's pleas (York. 875 P.2d at 597; Addendum A). This Court declined to
reach the merits of defendant's claim of error in finding him competent, but in a
footnote stated the likelihood that the evidence was sufficient to support the state
post-conviction court's determination of competency (jdL at 598).
Second State Post-Conviction Petition
On October 23, 1995, defendant filed another petition for postconviction relief in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, claiming: (1)
his trial counsel was ineffective; (2) the criminal trial court denied him due process;
(3) prosecutorial misconduct; and (4) the state post-conviction court denied him due
process (R. 217-24). The case was transferred to the Second Judicial District Court,
Davis County, which appointed Jerold Mcphee on a pro bono basis to represent
defendant (R. 226). Through counsel, defendant amended his post-conviction
petition, claiming that: (1) defendant received ineffective assistance of trial counsel;
(2) defendant's trial counsel had a conflict of interest; (3) defendant's plea was
unknowing and involuntary; and (4) defendant was incompetent to enter his guilty
pleas (R. 228-38). On August 29, 1996, defendant, through counsel, voluntarily
dismissed the amended petition (R. 240).

10

Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas
After unsuccessfully pursuing state post-conviction and federal habeas
relief, defendant moved to vacate his guilty pleas on the following grounds: (1)
defendant received ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (2) defendant's trial
counsel had a conflict of interest; (3) defendant's plea was unknowing and
involuntary; (4) defendant was incompetent when he pled guilty; and (5) the trial
court should have held a competency hearing prior to accepting defendant's guilty
pleas (R. 64-87).
On January 27, 1998, the trial court issued a ruling concluding that
defendant had failed to demonstrate unusual circumstances warranting relitigation
of the following claims which had been previously adjudicated by the post-conviction
court: (1) the trial court's failure to hold a competency hearing; and (2) defendant's
competence to plead guilty (R. 261-62). Additionally, the trial court reviewed the
record as a whole and determined that defendant's guilty pleas substantially
complied with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (R. 262). The trial court
scheduled §m evidentiary hearing for defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel and the voluntariness of his guilty pleas (R. 262).
The Evidentiary Hearing
On August 13, 1997, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. The following witnesses testified:
11

Dr. Chris Ghicadus, Dr. Heber Kimball, George Diumenti (defendant's original
defense counsel), defendant, Susan Wilson, and Mildreth Gilgen.6
Dr. Ghicadus
Dr. Ghicadus, who found defendant competent to stand trial, testified
only that he did not recall Mr. Diumenti contacting him after he had issued his mental
health report (R. 368).
Dr. Kimball
Dr. Kimball, who also found defendant competent to stand trial, testified
only that he did not recall Mr. Diumenti contacting him regarding his mental health
report (R. 371).
George Diumenti
Mr. Diumenti [hereinafter Diumenti] had been a criminal attorney for
approximately thirteen years at the time defendant retained him and his partner, Bill
Lindsley [hereinafter Lindsley] (R. 372-73). At that time, Diumenti had handled
approximately twelve murder cases, about four of which had gone to trial (R. 427).
Diumenti had handled three capital cases prior to defendant's, and immediately prior
to taking defendant's case, he achieved a successful "straight murder" conviction in
State v. Rocko. which was charged as capital murder (R. 428).

6

The transcript of the evidentiary hearing incorrectly refers to "Meredith
Gilgen," however, the witness's name first name is Milclreth. See R. 174, 323.
12

As a retainer for representing defendant, Diumenti received $6,000 on
June 21, 1984 (R. 373). The retainer funds came from traveler's checks that
defendant was carrying when he was arrested (id.). Diumenti does not get involved
in collections and, in fact, intentionally avoids knowing how much his clients owe him
so that it will not affect his judgment (R. 449). At the time Diumenti discussed the
plea agreement with defendant, he had no idea how much money defendant owed
him (R. 449-50).
Diumenti received all the evidence that the prosecution and police
agencies possessed; certainly "every single fact relevant and germane to
[defendant's] defense that was available" (R. 378,434,480). Over the course of his
15-20 meetings with defendant, Diumenti discussed all the evidence with defendant,
especially the incriminating evidence "ad nauseam" (R. 375,380). Defendant never
had to request to see evidence because Diumenti and Lindsley regularly contacted
defendant and submitted all their information to him (R. 390). Diumenti recalls
discussing with defendant the possibility that shots were fired at Pat York's house
after defendant left (R. 379-80).

Ultimately, Diumenti determined that the

defendant's claim that shots were fired after he left would have appeared ridiculous
to a trier of fact (R. 380).
Diumenti researched and discussed with defendant the possible
available mental defenses (R. 385). Diumenti initially thought that manslaughter was

13

a possibility due to defendant's "enraged" mental state (R. 385-86). The initial
manslaughter theory was based on the fact that Pat York and Jeff Longhurst had
both been taunting defendant and Pat was threatening to take defendant's business
(R. 386). Defendant's manslaughter defense started falling apart three or four days
after Diumenti received all the police reports (R. 450). In Diumenti's opinion, it was
an "open and shut case;" the only issue was whether Diumenti could convince a jury
that it was manslaughter based upon defendant's state of mind (R. 430). However,
the evidence supporting manslaughter never materialized (R. 430).
Defendant came up with many fanciful alternatives for the crime (e.g.
his twenty-one year-old daughter, Anita, was the shooter; some red-haired guy
hiding in the bathroom was the shooter) (R. 406). Defendant also theorized that Pat
York set him up in order to gain control of defendant's company (R. 463-64).
However, Pat York was already a majority shareholder in defendant's company and,
therefore, it would have been difficult to show any financial gain or benefit in her
framing defendant. In fact, pursuing Pat York's "motive" could have hurt defendant's
case (R. 463-64, 479-80).

Diumenti never found any evidence to support

defendant's alternative theories (R. 457).

Diumenti considers himself a good

salesman with a jury, but none of defendant's "wild scenarios" would have been
convincing to a jury (R. 406), especially since the evidence against defendant was
"absolutely totally frustrating, very significant, [and] pretty convincing" (R. 428). In
14

Diumenti's mind, there was no way to refute the fact that defendant shot Jeff
Longhurst and Pat York (R. 444).
The State had the following evidence implicating defendant in the
shooting of Jeff Longhurst and Pat York: Pat York and Anita Humphries7 identified
defendant as the shooter (R. 430-37); Pat York identified defendant's gun as the
weapon (R. 433); defendant voluntarily appeared at the police station and confessed
while Anita was on the phone with the police dispatcher on the 911 call about the
shootings (R. 435-36,442-43); defendant told Officer Stone that he flew to Salt Lake,
bought a pistol and extra bullets, and left the gun at Pat York's house (R. 438);
defendant spontaneously announced to Officer Richey that he turned himself in
because he "didn't like chases" (R. 440); defendant made a similar statement to
Officer Vaughn (R. 442); and defendant told Anita that if he found Jeff Longhurst
within 50 miles of Pat York, he would hunt him down and kill him like a dog (R. 45152).

Diumenti could not find a way to keep out the foregoing incriminating

statements (R. 436,439,443,451). Defendant's statement that he would hunt down
Jeff Longhurst and shoot him like a dog evidences pre-meditation and was the "one
hurdle that [Diumenti and Lindsley] never did really figure out how to get over" (R.
454). Diumenti was convinced that the admissible evidence against defendant

defendant's and Pat York's daughter.

15

"would have easily, if not overwhelmingly, supported a conviction of at least first
degree murder and very possibly capital homicide" (R. 479).
Lindsley was primarily responsible for determining what if any mental
defenses applied to defendant (R. 386). Diumenti and Lindsley discussed the
mental health issues many times and tried to reconcile the opinions of Drs. Ghicadus
and Kimball with the state of the law (R. 386-87). Lindsley told Diumenti that he had
reviewed this information with defendant (kL). Diumenti discussed with Lindsley the
possibility of discrepancies in the two reports that would justify getting a third expert
(R. 404).

However, they ultimately concluded that it would not have been in

defendant's best interest to hire a third expert (R. 410, 457). Diumenti did not tell
defendant that he would obtain additional experts; he simply advised defendant that
if more experts were necessary, defendant would have to retain them (R. 408-09).
Eventually, Diumenti told defendant that it was not in defendant's best interest to
undergo further testing and that no additional expert would be used (R. 410-412).
Although Diumenti originally filed a notice of intent to present an insanity
or mental health defense, after reviewing the case and the doctors' reports, he did
not see any facts that would support an insanity defense (R. 387-88, 455-56).
Diumenti personally advised defendant not to pursue such a defense in light of the
doctors' reports (R. 387). The preliminary hearing evidence and the doctors' reports
convinced Diumenti that the State's evidence supported the charges (R. 475-76).
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After discussing the possible plea agreement, which was in defendant's best
interest, defendant told Diumenti to withdraw the insanity defense (R. 389).
Diumenti explained to defendant the ramifications of withdrawing the insanity
defense (R. 390).
Diumenti did not check to see if the serial number on the murder
weapon matched the serial number listed on defendant's gun permit because, given
the evidence against defendant, it was not an issue (R. 455).
Defendant never told Diumenti that he had no memory of the shootings,
however, Diumenti was not surprised that during the plea colloquy defendant
claimed amnesia (R. 415). Defendant's plea colloquy claim of amnesia was a "poor
choice" on defendant's part, although not unusual as it is hard to admit taking
another person's life (R. 472-73,481). Defendant's self-serving statement during the
plea colloquy was the only evidence of defendant's memory loss (R. 480-81). Given
defendant's confession at the police station approximately ten minutes after the
shootings, a jury would not have believed defendant's claim of amnesia had he
presented it at trial (R. 429). Diumenti did not think that defendant lacked a memory
of the shootings because: defendant told the police that he was the shooter;
defendant stated that he had left extra bullets in the rental car; and in Diumenti's
initial conversations with defendant, defendant recalled specific details of
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conversations that he had with police up until the time he was taken into custody (R.
448).
Defendant agreed that the State's plea offer was "more than
reasonable" (R. 458). Diumenti discussed with defendant the possible outcome if
defendant went to trial, the strength of the State's case, the benefit of pleading guilty
to the reduced offenses, the elements of the amended charges, and the evidence
supporting the statutory elements (R. 417, 419). Diumenti was confident that
defendant understood the elements of the offenses (R. 458). He would never advise
a client to plead guilty if he thought that they truly did not understand the plea
proceedings and the facts that they were admitting (R. 533). Diumenti never told
defendant during the plea proceeding (or in preparation for the plea hearing) that in
order to restore his memory, defendant had to "just go along with the system" (R.
417-18). Diumenti has never used that phrase and finds it "repulsive," at least in a
pre-incarceration setting (R. 418). However, Diumenti advises his clients, postincarceration, to learn the institutional rules and conduct themselves accordingly to
help ensure a favorable parole hearing (R. 418). Diumenti never told defendant that,
as a condition of the plea agreement, defendant would only go to the state hospital
(R. 418). Defendant alone decided to accept the plea agreement; Diumenti did not
force him (R. 459).
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Diumenti does not recall defendant asking him to move to withdraw
defendant's pleas or pursue an appeal (R. 419-20). Diumenti informed defendant,
as he does in all homicide cases, that he would not handle an appeal (]g\). Diumenti
does not believe that an attorney can be effective at both trial and appellate work (R.
420).
Diumenti did "everything in [his] power" to ensure that Sue Wilson, wife
of prosecutor Mel Wilson, would prepare the presentence report (R. 420).8 Diumenti
has known Ms. Wilson since 1970 as a friend and as the wife of another friend (R.
421). In his opinion, Ms. Wilson reflects the best characteristics of what is required
of someone conducting presentence investigations; she is open-minded and listens
(R. 421). Having Ms. Wilson conduct the presentence investigation was "without
question" in defendant's best interest, and Diumenti strategically chose her (R. 421,
459). Diumenti told defendant that Ms. Wilson would be preparing the presentence
report and disclosed to defendant his relationship with Ms. Wilson and Mel Wilson
(R. 421-23). The presentence report was available for defendant to review and
Diumenti never told defendant that he was not allowed to see the report (R. 423-25).
Diumenti recalls that Lindsley reviewed the presentence report with defendant and

8

By the time the State offered defendant the plea agreement, Mel Wilson
had left the prosecutor's office (R. 460-01). Mel Wilson was not involved in
presenting the plea agreement; Diumenti dealt with William "Bill" McGuire (R.
460-01).
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that he (Diumenti) addressed the court during the sentencing hearing (R. 424-25).
The court gave defendant and Diumenti an opportunity to refute claims in the
presentence report, which accurately reflected defendant's state of mind and the
circumstances surrounding the crime (R. 426-27).

Diumenti consulted Lonnie

DeLand and another criminal attorney regarding how the Board of Pardons typically
treated consecutive five-to-life sentences (R. 532). Diumenti informed defendant
that he was probably going to prison; the only question was for how long (R. 534,
537).
Diumenti does not recall having a post-sentencing conversation with
Mildreth Gilgen (R. 531). Diumenti has never told anyone that: (1) defendant's MPD
did not surprise him; (2) he knew that defendant did not understand the crimes that
he pled guilty to; or (3) he had to tell defendant that he would not go to prison in
order to convince him to plead guilty (R. 532-33).
Defendant
Defendant's testimony contradicted Diumenti's on virtually every issue
(R. 485-509), however, the trial court found Diumenti more credible (R. 325-334,
550).
Sue Wilson
Prior to conducting defendant's presentence investigation, Ms. Wilson
informed defendant that she was married to Mel Wilson; it was her policy to disclose
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this information to everyone (R. 511-12). Defendant did not object to Ms. Wilson
preparing the presentence report and, in fact, told Ms. Wilson that he was
comfortable with her because he had heard that she was as fair or more fair than
anyone in her office (R. 512). Her husband, Mel, never attempted to influence her
presentence recommendation (R. 514).
Mildreth Gilgen
Ms. Gilgen met defendant while she was an intern in the psychology
department at the prison (R. 517-18). Ms. Gilgen assisted Dr. Carlisle in diagnosing
defendant as suffering from MPD, and was defendant's therapist (R. 521,523). Ms.
Gilgen previously testified that she considers defendant a friend and that she
allowed defendant (in the past) to call her at home (R. 525). Ms. Gilgen has been
assisting defendant (regarding defendant's attempt to vacate his guilty pleas) for the
past six years (R. 525, 528). Ms. Gilgen testified that in a phone conversation, after
defendant was in prison, Diumenti told her that he did not think defendant was guilty
but that he did not know how to represent defendant (R. 522). Diumenti also
allegedly told Ms. Gilgen that he was not surprised that defendant was diagnosed
as having multiple personalities (R. 521). The trial court discounted Ms. Gilgen's
testimony in its entirety, finding that, despite all the incriminating evidence, Ms.
Gilgen decided right away that defendant was not guilty and "set out to prove" it (R.
552-553, 333).
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The Trial Court's Ruling
The trial court found that the State's evidence implicating defendant as
the shooter was uncontroverted and inconsistent with defendant's alleged amnesia
(R. 549-550).9 Furthermore, defendant's testimony regarding which specific portions
of police reports he had seen previously negated his claimed memory loss (R. 550).
A jury would almost certainly have concluded that defendant's amnesia was "really
convenient" and, therefore, presenting an amnesia defense would have completely
devastated a potential insanity claim (R. 551).
Concerning defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for
failure to investigate, the trial court found that the only evidence Diumenti did not
develop was a comparison of the serial number on the gun and the number on
defendant's gun license (R. 551,331-32). The court properly determined that "if you
look at the facts of the case, those arguments are so ludicrous that in the context of
a capital homicide case, to even forward those kind of defenses with the flimsy
evidence that was available and in light of the other [incriminating] evidence, would
completely jeopardize any credibility that the defendant might have" (R. 551).

9

These incriminating facts are recited throughout this brief. Therefore,
appellee does not again list them here.
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The trial court also found that no conflict of interest existed between
defendant and Diumenti, and that Diumenti was not deficient in any way (R. 552-53).
Accordingly, the court did not address the issue of prejudice (R. 553, 334).
The court determined that Diumenti strategically chose Sue Wilson to
prepare the presentence report and that Ms. Wilson's relation to Mel Wilson was fully
disclosed to defendant (R. 332-33). Defendant neither objected to Ms. Wilson's
involvement nor identified any errors in the presentence report (R. 333, 554).
Regarding the voluntariness of the defendant's guilty pleas, the trial
court concluded that the State's evidence supported the capital homicide charges
and that Diumenti did not coerce defendant to plead guilty (R. 334). Defendant
made the ultimate decision to accept the plea offer and never insisted on going to
trial (R. 332). Furthermore, when he pled guilty, defendant was aware of the
elements of the charges and "entered that plea knowingly, knowing full well that he
was going to prison" (R. 552).
Finally, the trial court refused to relitigate the following claims that
defendant raised in his state post-conviction proceeding: (1) defendant's
competence to stand trial; and (2) the trial court's failure to hold a formal competency
hearing (R. 333).
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court properly declined to address defendant's claims
regarding his competency to stand trial because defendant previously litigated these
issues in his post-conviction petition. Defendant failed to demonstrate good cause
warranting further review.
Withdrawal of a guilty plea is a privilege, not a right. Accordingly,
defendant has the burden of demonstrating good cause. State v. Brocksmith. 888
P.2d 703, 704 (Utah App. 1994). Since defendant knowingly and voluntarily pled
guilty with the assistance of constitutionally effective counsel, no good cause exists
to vacate defendant's pleas. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying defendant relief.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO
ADDRESS ISSUES THAT DEFENDANT PREVIOUSLY
LITIGATED
Defendant previously litigated his claims that: (1) he was incompetent
to stand trial/plead guilty; and (2) the trial court erred in failing to hold a formal
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competency hearing. Accordingly, the trial court properly refused to readjudicate
these issues (R. 261-64; Addendum C). 10
During the evidentiary hearing on the first post-conviction petition filed
in Third District Court, defendant litigated the issue of his competency to plead guilty
(R. 159-201, 203-04).

The Third District Court, on post-conviction review,

specifically concluded that defendant was competent to enter his guilty pleas (|<±).
On appeal, this Court affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief and held that the
trial court did not err in failing to hold a competency hearing prior to defendant
pleading guilty.

See York. 875 P.2d at 597.

Since these issues have been

previously adjudicated adversely to defendant, res judicata and collateral estoppel
bar defendant from relitigating them. See Salt Lake Citizens Congress v. Mountain
States Tel. & Tel. Co.. 846 P.2d 1245, 1251 (Utah 1992) (res judicata prevents
relitigation of issues previously determined); Malone v. Parker. 826 P.2d 132, 136
(Utah 1992) (collateral estoppel bars readjudication of any issue decided in a prior
action). See also Burleigh v. Turner. 388 P.2d 412 (Utah 1964) (res judicata applies
to habeas corpus actions); Tillman v. Cook. 855 P.2d 211,214 (Utah 1993) (issues

10

ln his brief, defendant claims that the trial court erred in refusing to
relitigate the issue of trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to pursue additional
mental testing (Br. of App. at 9). However, the trial court took evidence and made
findings on this issue (R. 331, 404-412, 457).
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raised and litigated in a prior post-conviction petition may not be readjudicated,
absent unusual circumstances).
Additionally, although a motion to withdraw a guilty plea and a petition
for post-conviction relief are "separate and distinct procedures," Hurst v. Cook. 777
P.2d 1029, 1037 n. 8 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court has nevertheless
concluded that as a species of post-conviction remedy, a motion to withdraw a guilty
plea is subject to the same successiveness limitations as set forth in rule 65B, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure (currently rule 65C and Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 et
seq. (1996)). See State v. West. 765 P.2d 891, 893-95 (Utah 1988). The purpose
of the post-conviction rule requiring that all claims be raised in a single proceeding
absent a showing of unusual circumstances "was fashioned to prevent abuse by
prisoners who burden the courts and frustrate the ends of justice by trying to keep
cases alive indefinitely." Wright v. Carver. 886 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1994) (citations
omitted).
Furthermore, such a rule would prevent disparate treatment in the
review of post-conviction claims raised by defendants who plead guilty as opposed
to those who are convicted after a trial. Otherwise, defendants who plead guilty
have unlimited opportunities to challenge their pleas by filing repeated motions to
withdraw (or, as in this case, a motion to withdraw following two post-conviction
petitions), while defendants who have been convicted following a trial have limited
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available post-conviction remedies. See generally rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure; Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 et. seq. (1996). Finally, such a rule would
prevent a defendant who pleads guilty from circumventing the rules governing postconviction petitions merely by labeling his pleading as a "motion to withdraw"
(indeed, as defendant has done here). Therefore, this Court should affirm the trial
court's proper refusal to relitigate defendant's competency claims.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
DEFENDANT RECEIVED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL AND, THEREFORE, THAT NO GOOD
CAUSE EXISTED WARRANTING WITHDRAWAL OF
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEAS
In order to prevail on his claims of ineffective counsel, defendant must
demonstrate that: (1) specific acts or omissions fall outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance; and (2) counsel's deficient performance
prejudiced the outcome of the proceeding. State v. Frame. 723 P.2d 401,405 (Utah
1986) (citing Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). To satisfy the first of
the two prongs, defendant must demonstrate that counsel's "representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland. 466 U.S. at 688. This
requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that he was not functioning
as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Id- Accord
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State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). However, the court will not
second-guess counsel's legitimate strategic choices, regardless of how flawed those
choices might appear in retrospect. Strickland. 466 U.S. at 689. Defendant must
therefore overcome the strong presumption that counsel's performance fell "within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." id- See also State v. Dunn.
850 P.2d 1201, 1225 (Utah 1993); State v. Wood. 648 P.2d 71, 91 (Utah), cert.
denied. 459 U.S. 988 (1982).
In order to satisfy the second prong of the Strickland standard,
defendant must show that he was actually prejudiced by any alleged
unreasonableness. To meet this criteria, defendant must demonstrate that there is
a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. Strickland. 466 U.S. at 694; Dunn. 850 P.2d at 1225. In
the context of a guilty plea, defendant must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable
probability that but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would
have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart. 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (emphasis
added). See also Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d 516, 525 (Utah), cert, denied. 115
S. Ct. 431 (1994). The purpose of requiring a demonstration of prejudice from
defendants who challenge the validity of their guilty pleas on the ground of
ineffective counsel, is to maintain the "fundamental interest in the finality of guilty
pleas." Hill, 474 U.S. at 58.
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A reviewing court need not address both parts of the Strickland test if
defendant fails to meet his burden on one. See Parsons. 871 P.2d at 523 (citing
Strickland. 466 U.S. at 697). Accord State v. Carter. 776 P.2d 886,893 (Utah 1989);
Bundv v. DeLand. 763 P.2d 803, 805-06 (Utah 1988). Defendant has failed to
demonstrate either deficient performance or prejudice.
In the district court, defendant claimed that trial counsel was ineffective
in the following ways: (1) counsel induced defendant to plead guilty and advised
defendant to "just go along with the system" in order to help restore defendant's
memory; (2) counsel told defendant that if defendant "went along with the system,"
he would go to the Utah State Hospital; (3) counsel failed to procure additional
psychological testing; (4) counsel had a conflict of interest and aligned himself with
the State by endorsing a check for defendant's defense over to another individual
and informing defendant that he had no money for a defense; (5) counsel did not
allow defendant to decide whether to withdraw his previous pleas of not guilty by
reason of insanity; and (6) counsel failed to object to the presentence report being
written by the prosecutor's wife.
A. Guilty pleas
Defendant claims that Diumenti coerced him into pleading guilty by
telling defendant: (1) to just "go along with the system;" (2) that defendant would go
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to the state hospital instead of prison; and (3) that pleading guilty was the only way
defendant would receive treatment. The record refutes all of defendant's claims.
Diumenti discussed with defendant the possible outcome if defendant
went to trial, the strength of the State's case, the benefit of pleading guilty to the
reduced offenses, the elements of the amended charges, and the evidence
supporting the statutory elements (R. 332, 417,419). Diumenti was confident that
defendant understood the elements of the offenses, and he would never advise a
client to plead guilty if he thought that they truly did not understand the plea
proceedings and the facts that they were admitting (R. 458, 533). Diumenti never
told defendant during the plea proceeding (or in preparation for the plea hearing) that
in order to restore his memory, defendant had to "just go along with the system" (R.
332,417-18). Diumenti has never used that phrase and finds it "repulsive," at least
in a pre-incarceration setting (R. 418). Finally, Diumenti never told defendant that,
as a condition of the plea agreement, defendant would only go to the state hospital
(R. 418). Defendant alone decided to accept the plea agreement; Diumenti did not
force him (R. 332, 334,459). Defendant never insisted upon going to trial (R. 332).
The foregoing demonstrates that the trial court correctly concluded that
defendant failed to prove that Diumenti was constitutionally deficient (R. 334).
Therefore, the trial court appropriately declined to address prejudice (R. 334).
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Nevertheless, the fact that defendant never insisted upon going to trial (R. 332)
negates the requisite prejudice. See Hill. 474 U.S. at 59; Parsons. 871 P.2d at 525.
B. Additional Psychological Testing
Defendant claims that Diumenti was deficient for failing to procure a
third mental health professional to examine defendant regarding his competence to
stand trial and his mental state at the time of the offense (Br. of App. at 26-37).11
As noted previously, Lindsley was primarily responsible for determining
what if any mental defenses applied to defendant (R. 386).12 However, Diumenti
and Lindsley discussed the mental health issues many times and tried to reconcile
the opinions of Drs. Ghicadus and Kimball with the state of the law (R. 386-87).
Lindsley told Diumenti that he had reviewed this information with defendant (icl).
Diumenti discussed with Lindsley the possibility of discrepancies in the two reports
that would justify getting a third expert, however, they ultimately concluded that it
would not have been in defendant's best interest to hire a third expert (R. 404,410,

11

For the first time on appeal, defendant also claims that the trial court
erred in failing to order additional mental health experts to determine defendant's
mental state at the time of the offense (Br. of App. at 11-21). However, in the trial
court, defendant raised this issue only in terms of ineffective counsel (R. 71-72).
Since defendant does not argue plain error, this Court should decline to consider
this claim in terms of trial court error. See Monson v. Carver. 928 P.2d 1017,
1022 (Utah 1996); State v. Lopez. 886 P.2d 1105,1113 (Utah 1994); State v.
Schweitzer. 943 P.2d 649, 655 n. 3 (Utah App. 1997).
12

Defendant does not challenge Lindsley's effectiveness.
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457). Diumenti did not tell defendant that he would obtain additional experts; he
simply advised defendant that if more experts were necessary, defendant would
have to retain them (R. 408-09). Eventually, Diumenti told defendant that it was not
in defendant's best interest to undergo further testing and that no additional expert
would be used (R. 410-412).
Although Diumenti originally filed a notice of intent to present an insanity
or mental health defense, after reviewing the case and the doctors' reports, he did
not see any facts that would support an insanity defense (R. 387-88, 455-56).
Diumenti personally advised defendant not to pursue such a defense in light of the
doctors' reports (R. 387). The preliminary hearing evidence and the doctors' reports
convinced Diumenti that the State's evidence supported the charges (R. 475-76).
After discussing the possible plea agreement which was in defendant's best interest,
defendant told Diumenti to withdraw the insanity defense (R. 389).13 Diumenti
explained to defendant the ramifications of withdrawing the insanity defense (R.
390).
Defendant claims that Diumenti's request for a 90-day evaluation prior
to sentencing demonstrates that further testing could have benefitted defendant (Br.
of App. at 31-32). During the sentencing hearing, Diumenti referred to the mental
13

On appeal, defendant claims that he was not aware that the insanity
defense had been withdrawn (Br. of App. at 16). The trial court's findings refute
defendant's assertion (R. 331).
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health reports in requesting a 90-day evaluation (Sentencing Transcript [hereinafter
Sent. Tr.] at 10),14 however, at this point in the proceedings, he was simply
attempting to avoid the consecutive sentences recommended by Adult Probation
and Parole [hereinafter AP&P] (idj. Diumenti argued that the experts' reports noted
a "possibility" not a "probability" that defendant had some "medically discoverable
and treatable brain injury;" he did not argue or infer that defendant was incompetent
or insane (Sent. Tr. at 10-11).
Defendant has failed to demonstrate any deficiency in Diumenti's
strategic decision to forego additional testing. Furthermore, defendant has not
proven prejudice. Although, subsequent to defendant's pleas, the post-conviction
court determined that defendant suffered from MPD at the time he pled guilty, the
court ultimately concluded that defendant was nevertheless competent to stand trial
(R. 204). Concerning defendant's mental state at the time of the offense, Dr.
Ghicadus opined that defendant's alleged amnesia made it virtually impossible to
retrospectively determine defendant's state of mind at the time of the offense (R.
126). Dr. Kimball determined that defendant, who was "faking bad and faking sick,"
was able to recognize right from wrong and that there was no medical evidence of
14

Appellee did not receive the sentencing transcript from this Court as part
of the record below. However, the transcript had been prepared prior to the
hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and is part of the
official record. Since appellee does not have the record pages, counsel will refer
to the pages of the individual transcript.
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a dissociative state that would reduce defendant's capacity to control his impulses
(R. 129,132). Accordingly, defendant has failed to demonstrate that with additional
testing he would have insisted upon going to trial, facing capital homicide and
attempted second degree murder charges.
C. Conflict of interest
A Sixth Amendment claim "grounded on a conflict of interest is a special
subtype of an ineffectiveness claim." State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 72 (Utah App.
1990). A defendant who did not object to the conflict prior to trial has the burden on
appeal of demonstrating with specificity that "an actual conflict of interest existed
which adversely affected his [or her] lawyer's performance." Webb. 790 P.2d at 73
(quoting Cuvler v. Sullivan. 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980)); Zepp. 748 F.2d at 135-36
(citing Wood v. Georgia. 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981)). See ajso State v. Taylor. 947
P.2d 681, 686 (Utah 1997) ("defendant must demonstrate as a threshold matter..
. that the defense attorney was required to make a choice advancing his own
interests to the detriment of his client's interests). If the defendant makes such a
showing, prejudice need not be demonstrated to prevail on the claim. Cuvler. 446
U.S. at 349-50, 100 S. Ct. at 1718-19; Webb, 790 P.2d at 73. The court will
presume the defendant was prejudiced by the lawyer's performance. United States
v. Cronic. 466 U.S. 648, 658,104 S. Ct. 2039, 2046 (1984); Webb. 790 P.2d at 73
(quoting Strickland. 466 U.S. at 692).
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Defendant claims that Diumenti had a conflict of interest because: (1)
Diumenti misappropriated funds designated for defendant's bail; and (2) Diumenti
stated during the sentencing hearing that defendant "isn't going somewhere in either
event" (Br. of App. at 36-40).
1. Bail Money
Defendant claims that Diumenti misappropriated $14,000 which was
supposed to be used for defendant's bail (Br. of App. at 38). Defendant premises
his claim on the affidavits of Patricia Minick-York (defendant's ex-daughter-in-law)
and Mary Minick-Peterson (defendant's ex-daughter-in-law's mother) (jdj. The trial
court received as evidence a stipulation which contained the "testimony" of Ms. Mary
Minick and Ms. Patricia Minick-York (R. 319-20; Addendum D).15 Essentially, if
called to testify, Ms. Minick-York and Ms. Minick-Peterson would say that they gave
Mr. Diumenti a check for $14,000 to be used for defendant's bail (R. 319-20). The
check was made payable to Ms. Minick-Peterson, who never endorsed the check
over to anyone (id). Diumenti recalled that he and Lindsley were a conduit for either
Dave Randall or some other third party regarding approximately $15,000 to be used
for defendant's bail, however, nobody ever gave Diumenti any money (R. 398-99,
412). By concluding that no evidence supported defendant's claim of a conflict of
15

Appendix L attached to defendant's brief contains an incorrect version of
the stipulation that the parties admitted as evidence and, therefore, should be
stricken. Compare R. 319-20; Addendum D, with defendant's Appendix L.
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interest based upon the $14,000, the trial court implicitly found Diumenti more
credible than defendant, Ms. Minick-York, and Ms. Minick-Peterson (R. 333).16 The
trial court properly exercised its prerogative in this regard, and this Court should
defer to the trial court's assessment of the witnesses. See Casida v. DeLand. 866
P.2d 599, 601, 602 (Utah App. 1993) (district court has the prerogative to judge
credibility of witnesses and determine facts). Accord State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932,
936 (Utah 1994) (the trial court is in the best position to assess witness credibility
and derive a sense of the proceeding as a whole).
2. Sentencing Hearing Statements
Relying on State v. Holland. 876 P.2d 357 (Utah 1994), defendant next
alleges that Diumenti's statements during the sentencing hearing demonstrate a
conflict of interest (Br. of App. at 36). Defendant claims that Diumenti's statement
that defendant "isn't going somewhere in either event" demonstrates that Diumenti
had aligned himself with the prosecution and was not upholding his duty of loyalty
to defendant (kL). Defendant takes this quote out of context, and in any event, it
does not demonstrate a lack of loyalty on Diumenti's part.
AP&P recommended consecutive prison terms for defendant. During
the sentencing hearing, Diumenti asked the trial court to stay a prison term and
16

Even if true, the statements of Ms. Minick-Peterson and Ms. Minick-York
do not prove that Diumenti misappropriated any funds. Ms. Minick-York never
endorsed the $14,000 check, which was payable only to her (R. 319).
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place defendant on probation (Sent. Tr. at 9-10). Alternatively, Diumenti asked the
trial court to order a 90-day diagnostic evaluation to assist the court in a thorough
understanding of defendant's circumstances (Sent. Tr. at 10). Assuming that the
trial court would send defendant to prison (the only issue being concurrent versus
consecutive sentences), Diumenti argued that a 90-day evaluation was available and
appropriate since defendant would be serving at least some prison time (id at 1011). Diumenti's statement that defendant "wasn't going somewhere" simply reflected
his recognition that the trial court would most likely sentence defendant to prison.
Diumenti informed defendant that he was probably going to prison — the only
question was for how long (R. 534, 537). Diumenti's statement certainly does not
constitute a lack of loyalty toward defendant, as he did not take a position contrary
to defendant's best interests. Cf Holland. 876 P.2d at 360 (counsel breached duty
of loyalty by asserting, in an unrelated proceeding, that his client was a "prime
candidate for the death penalty"). Rather, Diumenti aggressively urged the trial court
not to sentence defendant to prison immediately, without the benefit of an additional
evaluation. If Diumenti had been acting as the State's ally, he would have concurred
with AP&P's recommendation for consecutive sentences.
Since the record is devoid of an actual conflict of interest which affected
Diumenti's representation of defendant, this Court should affirm the trial court's
ruling.
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D. Presentence Report
Defendant claims that Diumenti's strategic choice to have Ms. Wilson
conduct the presentence investigation was not in defendant's best interest (Br. of
App. at 40-43).

Defendant also alleges that Diumenti failed to discuss the

presentence report with him (jd. at 43-47). Even if defendant's claims were true,
they could not affect the propriety of his guilty pleas that he entered approximately
two months prior to sentencing.
1. Sue Wilson
Defendant does not challenge Diumenti's testimony or the trial court's
finding that Diumenti strategically chose Ms. Wilson to prepare the presentence
report. Rather, defendant claims that this strategic choice was deficient because
Ms. Wilson was obviously biased against defendant (Br. of App. at 41 -2). Defendant
presented no evidence of any bias on Ms. Wilson's part, and the record fully
supports the trial court's finding that defendant, after being fully informed of Ms.
Wilson's relationship to Mel Wilson, acquiesced to Ms. Wilson's preparation of the
presentence report (R. 332-33, 512). Reviewing courts accord great deference to
counsel's trial strategy. See Strickland. 466 U.S. at 689 (the court should not
second-guess counsel's legitimate strategic choices, regardless of how flawed those
choices might appear in retrospect). Defendant has failed to show any flaw in
Diumenti's decision or any error in the presentence report.
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2. Review of Presentence Report
Defendant alleges that Diumenti failed to review the presentence report
with him, and that as a result, defendant was unaware of alleged errors until many
years later (Br. of App. at 43-44). The presentence report was available for
defendant to review, and Diumenti recalled that Lindsley discussed the report with
defendant (R. 424-25). Therefore, defendant suffered no constitutional violation.
See State v. Lipskv. 608 P.2d 1241, 1247-48 (Utah 1980) (trial court need only
disclose presentence report to defendant prior to sentencing). Cf. State v. Casarez.
656 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Utah 1982) (defendant entitled to be resentenced where he
requested and was denied access to presentence report).
Despite his opportunity to do so, defendant declined to address the trial
court at sentencing (Sent. Tr. at 11). Defendant now describes several alleged
errors contained in the presentence report,17 however, during the evidentiary hearing
on the motion to withdraw, defendant neither argued nor presented evidence of any
presentence report inaccuracies (R. 333). Accordingly, this Court should decline to
review the alleged errors. See James v. Preston. 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App.

"Defendant also claims that the presentence report failed to mention that
the fingerprints of Jeff Longhurst and an unknown person were found on the gun,
while defendant's were not (Br. of App. at 44). Defendant's claim is directly
refuted by the record. At the preliminary hearing, Detective Steven Gray of the
Utah Crime Lab testified that he was unable to find any legible prints on the gun
(P.H.Tr. at 186).
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1987)(mere mention of issue in pleadings, when no supporting evidence is
introduced at trial, is insufficient to raise the issue at trial and fails to preserve issue
for appeal).
Since defendant failed to prove that Diumenti was ineffective, no good
cause exists warranting withdrawal of defendant's guilty pleas. Utah Code Ann. §
77-24-3 (1953). See also State v. Galleaos. 738 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Utah 1987)
(withdrawal of guilty plea is a privilege, not a right, and is left to the sound discretion
of the trial court). Therefore, this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED
WITH RULE 111N ACCEPTING DEFENDANT'S GUILTY
PLEAS AND, THEREFORE, NO GOOD CAUSE EXISTS
WARRANTING WITHDRAWAL OF DEFENDANT'S
GUILTY PLEAS
Since defendant entered his guilty pleas prior to the Utah Supreme
Court's decision in State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), the strict
compliance standard of Gibbons does not apply. See Stilling. 856 P.2d at 671;
Blair. 868 P.2d at 805. In cases decided prior to Gibbons, a guilty plea was knowing
and voluntary if the trial court demonstrated substantial compliance with Rule 11.
See State v. Stilling. 856 P.2d 666, 671 (Utah App. 1993); Willett v. Barnes. 842
P.2d 860, 861 (Utah 1992); State v. Hoff. 814 P.2d 1119,1123-24 (Utah 1991). A
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reviewing court, in determining whether there was substantial compliance with rule
11, must look at the "record as a whole" in order to determine whether a guilty plea
was knowingly and voluntarily given. See State v. Vasilacopulos. 756 P.2d 92, 94
(Utah App. 1988), cert, denied 765 P.2d 1278 (1988). Additionally, the failure to
make a specific finding under Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-11 (1984)18 is not critical if
the record as a whole establishes that defendant entered his pleas with full
knowledge and an understanding of the consequences and rights he was waiving.
See Jolivet v. Cook. 784 P.2d 1148,1149 (Utah 1989).
The Plea Colloquy
During the change of plea hearing, the court clerk handed a copy of the
amended information to defendant and read the charges aloud in open court (R.
141a).19 Although defendant claimed that he had no memory of the shootings, he
agreed with Diumenti's assessment that if the matter had gone to trial, the facts
probably would have lead to a first or second degree murder conviction, and for that
reason, defendant desired to plead guilty (R. 140-141). Defendant agreed that he
was pleading guilty because he believed that he "in fact engaged in the conduct,"
^Superseded by Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e).
19

The amended information alleged that on June 17, 1984, in Bountiful,
Utah, defendant intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Jeff Longhurst
(count 1); and attempted to cause the death of Patricia York, under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable
explanation (count 2) (R. 50).
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and because he wanted to "get this over with" (R. 143-44). The trial court explained
that by pleading guilty, defendant was waiving his right to a jury trial, his right to call
witnesses and to require the State to call witnesses, and his right to force the State
to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury of defendant's peers (R.
142). The trial court advised defendant of the possible maximum sentences for each
charge, and informed defendant that the court was not bound by any sentencing
recommendations (R. 141a, 142a). At the conclusion of the plea colloquy, the trial
court found that defendant knowingly pled guilty to both counts in the amended
information (R. 144).20
The Trial Court Record
In addition to the plea colloquy, defendant was present during the twoday preliminary hearing at which the following evidence was presented: (1)
defendant called Pat York's house on June 17, 1984 and told Anita that if Jeff
Longhurst was within 50 miles of defendant he would hunt Longhurst down and kill
him;21 (2) later that same evening, defendant entered Pat York's house and walked

20

Defendant claims that the trial court erred because it failed to find that he
voluntarily pled guilty (Br. of App. at 21-22). The failure to make this finding is not
prejudicial since the record as a whole demonstrates that defendant was fully
aware of the consequences of pleading guilty and of the rights that he was
waiving. See Jolivet. 784 P.2d at 1149.
21

P.H.Tr. at 103-114.
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past Anita's bedroom with a gun in his right hand;

(3) Anita heard several

gunshots;23 (4) Anita walked into Pat York's bedroom where she saw Longhurst on
the floor;24 (5) defendant slammed another magazine into the gun, wrestled
Longhurst out in the hallway, and eventually shot Longhurst three more times while
Anita was calling 911 ;25 (6) while struggling with defendant, Longhurst said "Donald,
you son-of-a-bitch, you hurt her again;"26 (7) Anita saw a bullet wound in Pat York's
neck;27 and (8) while Anita was still on the 911 call, defendant burst into the police
dispatch room and said, "I'm the man you want . . . I'm the one that did the
shooting."28 This evidence is more than sufficient to form a factual basis for
defendant's guilty pleas. See Willett v. Barnes. 842 P.2d 860, 861 (Utah 1992).
The foregoing illustrates that defendant pled guilty after being fully
informed of the consequences of pleading guilty, of his constitutional rights, and of

22

P.H. Tr. at 128-29.

23
24

P.H. Tr. at 130.

P.H. Tr. at 132-33.

25

P.H.Tr. at 134-36.

26

P.H.Tr. at 141.

27

P.H. Tr. at 134-35.

28

P.H. Tr. at 73-74.
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the factual basis for his pleas.

Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, warranting affirmance of
the trial court's ruling. See Blair. 868 P.2d at 805; Gardner. 844 P.2d at 294.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing demonstrates that: the trial court properly declined to
address defendant's previously litigated claims; defendant's trial counsel was
constitutionally effective; the trial court substantially complied with rule 11 in
accepting defendant's guilty pleas; and defendant has failed to establish good cause
warranting withdrawal of his pleas. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial
court's order denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this [ S ^ d a v of June, 1998.

ANGELA F. MICKLOS
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Division

29

Defendant claims that the record lacks evidence of an intent to kill.
Defendant overlooks the following facts: (a) that he vowed to hunt down and kill
Longhurst (R. 327; Addendum B)(P.H. Tr. at 103-114); and (b) that defendant
reloaded the gun during the shootings (P.H. Tr. at 134-36).
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CONCLUSION

L Habeas Corpus ^ W 4

When reviewing appeal from dismissal
The trial court erred in holding that the
initial stop v i s legal. The trial court's find- of habeas corpus petition, Court of Appeals
ings with respect to standing (under the surveys record in light most favorable to
abandonment theory) and consent are there- findings and judgment
fore inadequate.
1 Habeas Corpus *»276
We vacate the trial court's ruling and rePetitioner was not required to bring momand the case for further proceedings eon*
tion to withdraw guilty pies before filing
gistent with this opinion.
petition for habeas corpus in which he alleged that trial court should hive made findBILLINGS and GREENWOOD, JJ.,
ing regarding his competency before acceptconcur.
ing change of plea to guilty.
1 Criminal Law +»1028, 1030(1)
Court of Appeals will not consider issues
raised for first time on appeal absent plain
error or exceptional circumstances.
4. Criminal Law e*l028
Donald W. YORK, Petitioner
and Appellant,
Kenneth V. SHULSEX,
et i l n Respondents
and Appellees.
No. 920376-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
May 26, 1994.
Rehearing Denied June 20, 1994.
Petitioner, who pleaded guilty to seconddegree murder and attempted manslaughter,
filed petition for writ of habeas corpus.^ The
Third District Court, Sah Lake County, Pat
B. Brian, J., denied petition. Petitioner appealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings, P Jn
held that (1) information known to trial
court at time of plea hearing did not indicate
trial judge would have had bona fide doubt
with respect to petitioner's competency to
plead guilty so as to require sua iponte
determination on competency, and (2) petitioner did not meet his burden to marshal
evidence on claim that habeas court erred by
finding be was competent at time he entered
guilty plea.
Affirmed.

Issue is preserved for appeal when party
timely brings issue to attention of trial court,
thus providing court an opportunity to rule
on issue's merits.
5. Habeas Corpus ^816
Issue of whether plea-taking court
ahould have made competency inquiry before
accepting petitioner's guilty plea was properly preserved for appeal in habeas proceeding;
although all of legal arguments developed os
appeal may not have been articulated below,
underlying issue was clearly before hsbess
court, as were facts upon which petitioner
relied on appeal.
& Constitutional Law *»26&2(2)
Due process requires that defendant be
competent to plead guilt}-. U.S.CA Const
Amends. 6, 14.
?. Constitutional Law *»265£
To protect defendant's due process
fights, guilty pies must be voluntarily and
knowingly made. US.CA. ConsuAmends. 6,
14.
t Criminal Law **273(2)
Test for competency to plead guilty ii
the same as competency to stand trial

**>
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whether defendant has •ufficient present
tbHi:.\ to consult with his or her lawyer with
msonable degree of rational understanding
md has rational as well as factual underbinding of proceedings against him or her.
i Criminal Law ^1134(2)
In determining whether trial court
thcdd have had doubts as to defendant's
competency in entering plea and whether
jodge should have made sua tponte competency determination, appellate court may
consider only those facts that were before
roan when plea was entered.
10. Criminal Law *»2?3(2)
Information known to trial court at time
of plea hearing did not indicate that trial
judge should have had bona fide doubt with
respect to defendant's competency to plead
guilty and, therefore, trial court did not err
& failing to investigate whether defendant
wis competent to enter plea of guilty to
second-degree murder and attempted manslaughter, transcript of guilty plea hearing
lacked any statement or occurrence indicating that defendant was acting other than in
entire)}' rational manner, defendant answered all questions without any apparent
hesitation or lack of comprehension, and examiners of defendant diagnosed him as sufferingfromborderline personality disorder
but neither evaluation indicated that he was
not competent to plead guilty and in fact
both examinations showed defendant to be
without psychoses or serious mental problems.

lection of incident for which he or she is
charged.
13. Criminal Law «»273(2)
Whether amnesia renders a defendant
incompetent is evaluated on a ease-by-case
basis and in taking a guilty plea under such
circumstances, courts look to fairness of proceeding as affected by defendant's amnesia,
and defendant cannot plead guilty if fairness
of proceeding is compromised.
14. Criminal Law ^ l l S S ( l )
Competency is a factual issue reviewed
for dear error. Rules CrvProc, Rule 62(a).
15. Habeas Corpus «»705.1
If habeas corpus petition raises questions of fact, it is petitioner's burden to show
the judgment was clearly erroneous. Rules
CrvProc-, Rule 52(a).
16. Habeas Corpus +»824
As a prerequisite to attack onfindingsof
fact in habeas proceeding, petitioner must
marshal all evidence in support of findings
and demonstrate that evidence, including all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom is insufficient to support findings; this marshaling requirement provides appellate court
with basis from which to conduct meaningful
and expedient review of facts challenged on
appeal.

1L Criminal Law #-273(2)

17. Habeas Corpus *»824
Habeas petitioner failed to meet his burden to marshal evidence on claim that trial
court erred infindinghim competent at time
he entered plea of guilt}* to second-degree
murder and attempted manslaughter; rather, he merely reargued evidence most favorable to him, leaving it to Court of Appeals to
•art out what evidence actually supported
habeas court's competency determination.

Mere filing of notice to rely on defense
«f insanity was not sufficient to require competency hearing before accepting guilty plea.

Jerold D. McPhee, Salt Lake City (argued), for appellant

U Criminal Law m*Z7M)

Marian Decker (argued), Christine F. Soltia, and Jan Graham, Salt Lake City, for
appellees.

Defendant with amnesia is not per se
incompetent to plead guilty; defendant may
(bad guilt}* although he or she has no recol-

Before BILLINGS, DAVIS, and ORME,
JJ.
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BILLINGS, Pmiding Judge:
Petitioner Donald W. York appeals from
the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. We affirm.
FACTS
II] When reviewing an appeal from a
dismissal of a habeas corpus petition, " "we
survey the record in the light most fivorable
to the findings and judgment*" Bundy v.
IkUrtA 763 ?2d 803,805 (Utah 1988) (quoting Velasquez v. Pratt, 21 Utah 2d 229, 232,
443 PJZd 1020, 1022 (1968)). We recite the
facts accordingly. On June 17, 1984, petitioner purchased with cash an airline ticket
to fly from California to Salt Lake City under the name of Dan Hill. After arriving in
Salt Lake Dty later that day, he rented a car
using the name Donald York and drove directly to the home of his ex-wife, Patricia
York. Petitioner entered his ex-wife's home
armed with a loaded gun, went to her bedroom and fired twelve to fourteen times,
seriously wounding her and killing Jeff
Longhurst
After the shootings, petitioner surrendered
himself to the Bountiful pobce. He told officers that there had been a fight at Patricia
York's residence and asked whether his exwife and Longhurst were alive. He also told
the pobce where to find the gun and shells,
and that for what he had done he was going
to heU and could no longer be a member of
his church.
Petitioner was charged with first degree
murder, a capital offense, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. I 7&-&-202 (1984), attempted second degree murder, a second degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. H 76-5-203
(1979) and 76-1-102 (1983), and aggravated
burglary, a first degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. I 76-6-203 (1978).1 Petitioner pled not guilty.
Hereafter, petitioner tendered a notice of
defense claiming that be was not guOty by
reason of insanity or that he had diminished
mental capacity at the time the offense occurred under Utah Code Ann. i 77-14*8
I. The burglary charge was subsequently dis*

(1990). As a consequence, the court appoint.
td Dr. Chris Ghicadus, M.D. and Dr. Hebe
C. Kimball, PhD., of the Davis Count) Meatal Health Center, "to examine the defends:
and investigate his mental condition"
Dr. Ghicadus examined defendant and conduded that be was "mental]}' competent to
understand trial proceedings and would be
able to assist in his defense " Further, be
diagnosed petitioner as having borderline
personality disorder, meaning that petitioner
was "not <msane' in a legal sense of the word,
is not psychotic in a psychiatric sense, but
has variances and neurotic traits that do DO!
aeriously interfere with [his] everyday Kit*
Similarly, Dr. Kimball concluded thai
"there is no medical history or evidence d
any fugue or dissociative states which woulc
have reduced his capacity to control his m
pulses at the time of the alleged crime," asc
that "[hfc shows no signs of any psychoses
illogical thinbng delusions or hallucinations
His train of thought appears to be normal1
Both doctors suggested further testing fa
order to state firmly why petitioner had pen
ods of memory lapse.
Pursuant to a plea bargain, petitioner pled
guilt}* to reduced charges of second degree
murder, a first degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. i 76-6-203 (1979), and attempted manslaughter, a third degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. { 76-6-205
(19S5). At the plea hearing, petinoner
claimed he had no specific memory of the
shootings, however, he indicated that nevertheiess he desired to accept the plea agreement and plead guilty to both shootings.
The trial court accepted his plea without
formally inquiring into his competency, finding he "knowingly entered his plea of guilty"
to both counts.
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel
requested a ninety-day diagnostic evaluation
to investigate the "possibility that can't be
discounted, that Mr. York does have some
. . . medically discoverable and treatable
brain injury." Prior to sentencing, the court
asked if there was any known reason «ty
sentence should not be imposed, to which
defense counsel responded negatively. Withmisted.

\ ^
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tot inquiring into his competency, the court
Iben sentenced petitioner to five years to life
Icr thefirstoffense and to zero to five years
Jbr the second offense, to be served consecuthth' at the Utah State Prison.

The court denied the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus,findingthat although petitioner suffered from MPD at the time of the
crimes and his plea, he was competent to
plead guilt)*. Petitioner appeals the court's
denial, arguing: (1) the trial court should
At the Prison, petitioner was examined and have made afindingregarding his competenvested by Dr. Alms Carlisle, PhD., the pris- cy before accepting his change of plea to
*t psychologist. Dr. Carlisle conducted sev- guilty; and (2) the habeas court erred in
en) hypno&s/therapy sessions with petition- finding be was competent when be entered
er in 1985 and ultimately diagnosed him as his guilty plea.
taring multiple personality disorder (MPD).
[2] TT}o successfully attack a guDty plea
to other personality was identified as Dan
collaterally, a petitioner must demonstrate an
obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudiAs s result of the MPD diagnosis, petition- cial denial of a constitutional right in the
erfileds petition for a writ of habeas corpus reception of the plea and must show cause
m April 2, 1985. Petitioner did cot move to why he or she took no direct appeal." Sumwuhdrsw his guilty plea or otherwise directly mers t>. Cook 759 P,2d 841, 843 (Utah App.
appeal his conviction. In February 1990, the 1988); accord Solazar t>. Warden, 852 ?2d
trial eom granted petitioner's motion for the 988, 991 (Utah 1993). Petitioner did sot
ippointmem of a psychiatric expert to evalu- directly appeal his conviction because the
ate petitioner's "mental condition at the time time for appeal had lapsed by the time he
kit pka was entered," and appointed Dr. was diagnosed with MPD, and the Sute does
Aim E. Jeppsen, MIX, to evaluate him in sot contend that as a result we should refuse
preparation for a bearing on the habeas cor- to bear his petition. We further note that
petitioner was not required to bring a motion
pus petition.
to withdraw his guilty plea before filing a
An evidentiary hearing on the petition was petition for habeas corpus. See Lancaster v.
kid on July 3,1991, at which petitioner, Dr. CdoJL, 763 Pid 805, 606 (Utah 1988) (per
Carlisle, and Dr. Jeppsen testified. Petition- curiam). Thus, our review is appropriate.
r diimed that he could not recall the details
In reviewing appeals from a dismissal of a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the
•f the shootings or the entry of his guilty
trial court's conclusions of law are repleas. He further testified that be pled
viewed for coiTectness. However, in refuihy on the advice of counsel with the unviewing findings of fact "we survey the
derstanding that this was the only way he
record in the light most favorable to the
could get treatment for his alleged amnesia.
findings and judgment; and we will not
Dr. Carlisle testified that although petitioner
reverse if there is a reasonable basis thereprobably suffered from MPD at the time of
in to support the trial court's refusal to be
the shootings and his plea, he was nevertheconvinced that the writ should be granted.*
less competent to have pled guilty. Dr. Carlisle explained that petitioner would have Butterfield v. Cook 817 ?26 833, 836 (Utah
been able to think rationally, form a mental App.) (citation omitted) (quoting Medina v.
state of intent to loll, understand the nature Cook 779 P^d 658, 668 (Utah 1989)), cert
tf the proceedings and the nature of the denied, 826 PAJ 651 (Utah 1991).
et&es, and assist his attorney. Thus, be
t FAILUKE TO DETERMINE PETIconcluded that petitioner was competent to
TIONER'S COMPETENCY BEFORE
ester a guilty plea to the abootings. Dr.
ACCEPTING GUILTY PLEA
Jtppsen agreed with Dr. Carlisle's diagnosis
A. Preservation of Issue for Appeal
«f MPD; however, be testified that petitioner
*TKld not have been competent to plead
CM] The Sute asserts as a threshold
fuOty because of this psychiatric disorder. matter that the msjority of theories upon
Xtotfoner'sairline ticket to Sah Lake City on
*e da\ of the shootings b recorded under the

Dame of Dsn Kill. PrefumiMv this it s misspell*
tog of ton Hell
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which petitioner relies in arguing that the
trial court should have made a finding of
competency before accepting his change of
plea to guilty were not presented to the
habeas court, and thus they have not been
preserved for appellate review. This court
will not consider issues raised for the first
tune on appeal absent plain error or exceptional circumstances. State v. Brown, 856
T26 858, 859 (Utah App.1993); accord Stale
v. A/die, 864 T26 890, 892-93 n. 6 (Utah
1993). An issue is preserved for appeal
when "a party . . . time]} bringls] the issue
to the attention of the trial court, thus providing the court an opportunity to rule on the
issue's merits.91 LeBarxm & Assoc, Inc. v.
Rebel EnUr., Inc., 823 ?2d 479, 482-83
(Utah App.1991).
[5] We conclude the issue of whether the
pie*-taking court should have made a competency inquiry before accepting petitioner's
guilty plea was properly preserved for appeal Although all of the legal arguments
developed on appeal may not have been articulated below, the underlying issue was clearly before the habeas court, as were the facts
upon which petitioner now relies on appeal
This issue was sufficiently brought to the
habeas court's attention through petitioner's
second amended petition and the evidence
contained in the record.
B. Finding of Competency
Petitioner argues the original trial court
erred in failing to investigate whether be wis
competent to enter a guilty plea, He claims
that his previous plea of not guilty, combined
with his notice of intent to offer a defense of
insanity and his inability to remember the
shootings, ahould have alerted the trial court
that there were questions regarding his com*
petency. The State counters that petitioner
J. Tnor to Codimz. the question of whether the
standard for determining competency to plead
guilty wis higher than the standardfordetrrmin*
Ins competency to stand tna] drvidtd both state
and federal courts Compart Chavez v. United
Stats 656 T26 512, 511-19 (9th Ctr 1911) (applying more stringent ttandard for determining
competency to enter guilty plea than to stand
tml) with Chchakfy v Umtad Statu, 926 T2d
624, 633-35 (7th Cir 199J) (determining competency standard for pleading guihy fe identical to

st no time alleged he was incompetent to
enter a guilt}* plea.
(6,7] Due process requires that a defendant be competent to plead guilt), thope r
Aftssouri 420 VS 162, 172, 95 S.Ct 896,
904, 43 L.Ei2d 103 (1975), Pate v Robin•cm, 883 U-S. 875, 885, 86 S Ct. 836, 842,15
LXd2d 815 (1966). "A mental)} incompetent defendant can provide no defense, and
proceedings against such a defendant do not
comport wnh due process" State t Young
780 ?2d 1233,1236 (Utah 1989) Additionally, in order to protect a defendant's due
process rights, s guilty plea must be voluntarily and knowingly made See State r.
Gibbons, 740 ?2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987);
State v. Stilling, 856 ?2d 666, 671 (Utah
App.1993).
[6] The test for competency to plead
guilty is the same as competency to stand
trial* "whether the defendant has 'sufficient
present ability to consult with his [or her]
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding9 and has 'a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings
against him [or her].'* Godintz t Moron,
— U.S
,
, 113 S Ct 2680,26S5,125
L Edid 821 (1993) (quoting Dusky t United
StaUt, 862 VS 402, 403, 80 SCt 788,789,4
LXdid 824 (1960) (per curiam))1
Courts have variously described the level
of doubt regarding a defendant's competency
that is required before the judge must make
a sua sponte competency determination4
However, courts have general!} found that
due process requires a court to sus sponte
determine competency before taking s guihy
plea when there is substantial evidence of
incompetence such that a reasonable judge
would have a bona fide doubt as to the
defendant's competence. See United Stain
« Lewi* 991 F-2d 624, 527 n. 4 (9th Dr.),
cert denied. — VS.
, 114 S.CL 216,126
competency standard for standing ttial) mid
Shaw v Martin, 733 FJd 304, 3M (4th Ctrl
cm dtmad 4*9 U.S 873. 105 SCt 230. 13
LEd^d 159 (19S4) (same)
4. Significantly, however, these terms have been
found to describe the same conititimona! standard United Stats v Uwu, 991 F 2d 524 527
A. 4 (9th Cir.1993), Ch**L *56 T2d si 516 a I.
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t l d i d 172 (1993); United Sides v. Johns,
S Tii 953, 956 (7th Clr.1984); Chavez v.
Wed State* 656 F.2d 512, 516 n. 1 (9th
Cr.1951); People v. Thomas, 246 DLAppJd
70S. 186 m.Dec. 505, 507, 616 NJEid 695,
m: (1993); Berndi t\ State, 733 S.WA3 119,
l £ (Tenn.CrinLApp.19S7).

defendant's competence.1
phasis added).

i d at 1238 (em-

Similarly, in State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281
(Utah 1985), the supreme court considered a
defendant's competence to stand trial. The
defendant in Bailey had been in the prison
hospital, and the prison psychiatrist found
Tro Utah eases have addressed the level him not competent to stand trial; however,
if doubt necessitating a competency determi- two other doctors later determined he was
aition under circumstances aomewhat similar competent to stand trial. Id at 282. The
io this appeal. Most recently, in State v. trial court did not hold a bearing on bis
Young. 780 T2i 1233 (Utah 1989), the defen- competency to stand trial, nor did defense
dantfileda notice prior to trial that he would counsel petition for such a bearing. Id The
Ttly en the defense of diminished capacity, Bailey court held that the defendant was not
and two alienists were appointed to examine entitled to a competency bearing when his
kim. Id it 1235. One doctor testified that most recent psychiatric evaluations indicated
the defendant had a mental Alness that con- be was competent and be filed no petition.
fined of mild to moderate depression, alcohol li at 265.
abuM. mixed drug disorder, and attention
(9] In determining whether a trial court
deficit disorder. The second doctor testified
that the defendant did not suffer from any should have had doubts as to competency, an
stents] illness and diagnosed him as having appellate court may consider only those facts
cn]v an antisocial personality disorder. At that were before the court when the plea was
till, the defendant testified that he had no entered. See Levis, 991 F2d at S27;
recollection of the encounter with the victim. Williams v. Bordenkircker, 696 F-2d 464,467
(6th Or.), cert denied 461 U-S. 916, 103
li
S.CL 1898, 77 L.Ed2d 287 (1983); Berndt
During the fourth day of trial, defense 733 S.WJM at 122. Thus, we must determine
counsel moved to allow the defendant to whether the information known to the trial
plead guilty and mentally ill. The defendant court at the time of petitioner's plea hearing
gated he wanted to "get it over with.*1 Id should have raised a bona fide doubt regardThe trial judge, noting the defendant's obvi- ing bis competency.
eu» state of emotional distress, concluded
that the defendant's request was not made in
[10] At the plea hearing, the court had an
a wholly deliberate and knowing manner and extended dialogue with defendant, which inthu* refused to allow petitioner to plead cluded:
fuflty. The defendant was subsequently
MR. DIUMENTI [defense counsel]: . . .
found guilty.
Mr. York desires to enter a plea of guilty.
On appeal, the defendant argued that he
should have been given a hearing on his
Do you have any questions, Don, about
competence to stand trial, claiming the judge
what
your prerogatives ait and what your
rejected his plea because he was incomperights
are?
tent Id at 1235-36. The Young court stated: "It is well established that ?ajn allegaMR. YORK: No. The only thing I ask,
tion of -nervous difficulties" does not raise a Your Honor, is that since I have no memoknofide doubt at to competency.'* li at
ry of it, I ask that before you sentence me,
1237 (emphasis added) (quoting People *
that you send me down for evaluation.
Vitok 28 IlUppid 229, 827 N£-2d 602,
THE COURT: Tfcat will go a Httlejkttr,
W (1975)). The court found on appeal that
let me first aak you, Mr. McGuire Jtfounsel
the trial Judge did not err In not holding a
for
the B u t e ] . . . .
competency bearing because no objective
fccu "raised a rtasonable doubt as to the
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THE COURT: Now, are you under the
influence of any drugs or alcohol at this
time?
MR. YORK: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Are you being treated for
any mental illness?
MR. YORK: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You are receiving no medications in that regard?
MR, YORK: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Are you satisfied with the
counsel that you have received from Mr.
Diumenti in this matter?
MR. YORK: Very much so, yes.
THE COURT: You have gone over it
thoroughly with him?
MR. YORK: Yes, Your Honor, I have.
THE COURT: Now, are you willing to
plead guilt}* because you are in fact guilt}*?
MR. DIUMENTI: Your Honor, if I might,
AS far as Count II is concerned, I believe
that's a fair statement and I believe Mr.
York wQl answer in the affirmative.
As far AS Count I is concerned, Your
Honor has seen both the psychiatric and
the psychological . . . unfortunately the
blackout periods thai they have talked
about deaJ with Mr. Longhurst Don has,
number one, reviewed all of the evidence
and the testimony And I, the only reason I
interject At this point in time is I know he's
going to tell the Court that . . . that's the
way it looked but objectively he can't aay
yea.
I told him also, however, and advised
him, that it is valid for A person not recalling, [fior Any of several reasons, the exact
UeU of an event to enter a plea of guilty
Attendant a negotiated settlement so they
do not unnecessarily, and in Addition I
believe unwisely subjects themselves to the
potential of being convicted of a more serious crime.
And to it I might, Don, do you understand what the Judge w d as far as Count
II?
MR. YORK: Yea, air.
MR. DIUMENTI: Are you entering a plea
of fuQty on your belief that you in fact

engaged in conduct that is described jn
that act?
MR. YORK: Yes.
MR. DIUMENTI: As far as Count L
THE COURT: Well, let the Court ask you
then, Mr. York, as far as Count I. That
requires that you be proved beyond a maonable doubt to have intentionally or
knowingly caused the .death of Jeff LOBghurst And are you willing to enter s
plea of guilt>' to that charge?
MR. YORK: To get this over with, I inD
do that, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You rtAliae that by so do>
ing, AS far as this Court is concerned, you
have Admitted that particular charge?
MR. YORK: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And that you have waived
all those rights which I have explained to
you previously in connection with that particular charge?
MR. YORK: I'm fully aware.
The transcript of this hearing lacks any
statement or occurrence indicating that petitioner was acting other than in an entirely
rational manner. Petitioner answered all
questions directed to him without any apparent hesitation or lack of comprehension.
Furthermore, the evaluations of Drs. Ghi*
eadus and Kimball, which were available to
the court, do not raise a reasonable doubt u
to petitioner's competency. Both examiners
diagnosed him as suffering from borderline
personality disorder, but neither evaluation
indicated that he was not competent to plead
guilty. In fact, both examinations shoved
petitioner to be without psychoses or serious
mental problems. In his psychiatric evaluation, Dr. Kimball stated that petitioner
"shows no signs of Any psychoses, illogical
thinking, delusions or hallucinations. Hi*
train of thought appears to be normal"
Similarly, Dr. Ghicadus summarised:
TUxt isftirthernE evidence of a psyehosfe
or other mental problem that would mske
him so seriously unstable as to not be Able
to make a decision about his behavior. It
is therefore, my conclusion thai tht ff*m
if menially competent io undentand trid

<i>
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froetedings and would be able to assist in Based on the facts of this ease, we cannot
kis defense. (Emphasis added).
My the trial court erred in concluding defendant was able to enter a knowing guilty plea,
ft>us. there was pre-plea evidence of competency. See Johnson v. United States 633 despite his alleged inability to remember the
Aid 828, 832 (D.C.1993) (holding in context ahootings. In sum, the information known to
of motion to withdraw guilty plea, competen- the trial court at the time of the plea hearing
cy hearing "not required if there is a pre-plea does not indicate that it ahould have had a
determination of competence baaed on a psy- bona fide reasonable doubt with respect to
petitioner's competency to plead guilty.
chiatric evaluation").
[11] The evidence petitioner contends
shows his entitlement to a competency heariif it the time he pled guilty is his previous
aotice of intent to raise the defense of insanity and his communicated lack of memory of
the shootings. However, the mere filing of
notice to rely on the defense of insanity is not
sufficient to require a competency hearing
before accepting a guilty plea. See In re
Hanson 623 K2& 466 (VU993) (finding prior
successful insanity plea did not require court
to inquire into defendant's competency). (12,13) Furthermore, a defendant with
amnesia is not per ae incompetent to plead
guilty. State v. Owens, 248 Kan. 273, 807
Pid 101,106-07 (1991); accord Thomas, 616
KXid at 698. A defendant may plead
guilty although he or ahe has no recollection
of the incident for which he or ahe is
charged. Commonwealth v. Hubbard* 871
Mass. 160, 355 K X i d 469, 475 (1976); State
'. m*r. 292 Minn. 453,193 N.Wid 819,820
il9?2) (per curiam); People v. Francabandfw. 33 N.Yid 429, 354 N.Y.S.2d 609,614-15,
330 X.Eid 292, 296 (1974). Whether amnesia renders a defendant incompetent is evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Owens, 807
T26 at 106. In taking a guilty plea under
such circumstances, courts look to the fairBess of the proceeding as affected by the
defendant's amnesia. A defendant cannot
ptead guilty if the fairness of the proceeding
fc compromised. Id; People ft Douglas, 189
*&2d 241,52? X.Y£2d 151,153 QJ.YJBap.
1988) (finding trial court could accept defend s guilty plea as voluntary and intellifrat, despite genuine lack of recall due to
ttumatic amnesia).
3- The Tenth Circuit stated: ICJompetency Is a
fcctual issue subject to the presumption « cor*nness." Laffeny v. Cook, 949 T2d at 1549.
Hovrver, the presumption of wrtctotu It not

n . HABEAS COURTS FINDING
OF COMPETENCY
Petitioner next contends that the habeas
court erred by finding be was competent at
the time be entered his guilty plea. The
State responds that petitioner has failed to
meet his burden to marshal the evidence and
additionally that even if he is able to overcome the marshaling requirement, the habeas court properly determined he was competent to plead guilty.
{14,15} Competency is a factual issue, reviewed under Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Stale v. Drobel 815 P.2d
724, 734 (Utah App.), cert denied 836 P-2d
1883 (Utah 1991); ocecmf Lafferiy v. Cook
949 F^d 1546, 1549 (10th Cir.1991), cert
denied, — US.
, 112 S.CL 1942, 118
L.Ed2d 548 (1992); * Stale u Lafferiy, 749
?2A 1239,1243-44 (Utah 1988). Rule 52(a)
provides: "Findings of fact, whether based
on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be
aet aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of
the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses." Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). "A finding
attacked as lacking adequate evidentiary support is deemed 'dearly erroneous1 only if we
conclude that the finding is against the clear
weight of the evidence.91 Reid t?. Mutual qf
Omaha Ins. Co, 776 P.2d 896,899-900 (Utah
1989). We review the evidence in a light
most favorable to the trial court's findings
and affirm if there is a reasonable basis for
doing ao. Gillmor * Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461,
462 (Utah App.1987), cert denied, 765 T2d
1278 (Utah 1988). It is petitioner's burden
to show the judgment was clearly erroneous.
irrebuttable; ttjhe threshold question Is whether the competency determination is fairly supported by the record." Id at a. 1.

598

Utah

«75 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

Stewart v. StaU, 830 P^d 806, 808 (Utah
App.1992).
[16] As a prerequisite to in attack on
findings of fact, the petitioner must marshal
all evidence in support of the findings and
demonstrate "that the evidence, including all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is
insufficient to support the findings.9* Grayton Roper Lid v. Firdinton, 782 ?2A 467,
470 (Utah 1989); eet West Valley City v.
Majestic Inv. Co, 618 F2& 1811,1815 (Utah
App.1991) (discussing in detail what "onerous* marshaling burden entails for appellants). This marshaling requirement proTides the appellate court the basis from
which to conduct a meaningful and expedient
review of facts challenged on appeal. See
Wright v. Wttteide Nurtery. 787 ?2A 608,
612 n. 2 (Utah App.1990).
[17] In the present ease, petitioner does
not meet his marshaling burden; rather, he
merely reargues the evidence most favorable
to him, leaving it to this court to sort out
what evidence actually supports the habeas
court's competency determination. Because
he has failed to meet this burden, we decline
to consider the merits of his argument on
appeal Crookston v. Fin Iru ExcK 817
P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991).*
CONCLUSION

be has failed to meet his burden to marshal
the evidence. Nevertheless, there is an a6V
quate evidentiary foundation for the habeas
court's determination that petitioner t*s
competent at the time he entered his guih}
pleas. Accordingly, we affirm the trial
court's denial of petitioner's habeas corpus
petition.
DAVIS, J- and ORME, Associate PJ„
concur.
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Christa C. SCHAUMBERG,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Thomas J. SCHAUMBERG, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 920865~CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
May 26, 1994.

The information known to the trial court at
the time of the plea hearing does not indicate
that the trial judge should have had a bona
fide doubt with respect to petitioner's competency to plead guilty. Furthermore, we refuse to consider petitioner9* elaim that the
trial court erred in finding him competent at
the time he entered his guilty plea because

Divorce action was brought. The fturd
District Court, Salt Lake County, Ttoothj R.
Hanson, J., entered a final decree of divorce
Husband appealed. The Court of Appeals.
Davis, J„ held that (1) trial court did not
abuse its discretion in awarding wife $800
per month alimony; (2)findingthat husband
spent loan, a marital debt, to maintain and
improve business building was not dearly

S. However, our review of the record tugf est* the
likelihood that tufficient evidence tupports the
habeas court'• finding that peuooner wis competent at the tune he entered his guilty plea. Dr.
Carlisle teftified that although petitioner probably suffered from MPD at the time of the shoot*
fngs he was nevertheless competent to have pled
ffuihy. He further testified that petitioner would
have been able to think rationally, form a mental
itate of intent to kili, understand the nature of
the proceedings and the nature of the crime,
comprehend the reasons for punishment, and
assist his attorney. Dr. Carlisle explained that
petitioner "would have the rational thought of
determining whether or not [pleading guilty] was

the choice he wanted to make at the erne " Df
Carbsie also testified that if the host personal*
had real}y beec unaware of what the alternate
personality had done, he would have expected
more confusion and inability to remember m
petitioner's statements at the police station, and
that It wis possible petitioner was blockmf n»
memory. Furthermore, the trial court's nndaf*
and conclusions dear!) indicate the court appbed the appropriate leg*J standard in findfflf
petitioner competent to plead fuih>. as required
by Dusky v Vnuti SIOJCS, H2 t).S 403,10 $ &
7IB, 4 L Ed^d $24 (I960) (per curiam) and Utah
Code Ann i 7 7 - 1 W (2993).
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEAS

v.
DONALD WILLIAM YORK,
Defendant.

Case No. 841704638
Judge Rodney S. Page

The above-captioned matter came before the Court on August 13,1997 for
an evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Defendant was
present and was represented by Jerold McPhee. Plaintiff was represented by Angela F.
Micklos Assistant Attorney General. After hearing testimony and oral argument, the Court
now enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On June 17,1984, defendant purchased with cash an airline ticket to

fly from California to Salt Lake City under the name Dan Hill. Defendant brought with him
$6,000 in traveler's checks, and an undetermined amount of cash. After his arrival in Salt
Lake City later that day, defendant rented a car using the name Donald York. Thereafter,
defendant drove to the home of his ex-wife, Patricia York. Defendant, armed with a loaded
gun, entered his ex-wife's home. Defendant went to Ms. York's bedroom and fired twelve
to fourteen shots, seriously wounding Ms. York and killing her boyfriend, Jeff Longhurst.
2.

Moments after the shootings, defendant surrendered himself to the

Bountiful police. Defendant told officers that there had been a fight at Ms. York's residence
and asked whether Ms. York and Mr. Longhurst were alive. Defendant also told police
where to find the gun and shells, and that for what he had done he was going to hell and
could no longer be a member of his church.
3.

In June 1984, defendant was charged in the Second Judicial District

Court, Davis County, with first degree murder, a capital offense, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-202 (1984); attempted second degree murder, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-203 (1979), 76-4-102 (1983) and aggravated burglary,
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1973).
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4.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, an amended information was filed in

October 1984 charging defendant with the reduced offenses of second degree murder, a
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1979) and attempted
manslaughter, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1975).
Additionally, the State agreed not to seek a firearm enhancement and also agreed to
recommend that defendant be sentenced to concurrent terms.
5.

On December 6, 1984, the trial court sentenced defendant to serve

five years to life in the Utah State Prison for the second degree murder, to run
consecutively with a term of zero to five years for attempted manslaughter. The trial court
further ordered defendant to pay a $3,600 victim restitution fee.
6.

The evidence against defendant was overwhelming. Defendant's

daughter, Anita, told police and would have testified that she saw defendant walk past her
bedroom holding a gun; that she heard several shots; and that she overheard Longhurst
state an epithet that defendant had shot him. At the hospital, defendant's ex-wife, Patricia,
identified defendant as the shooter and identified defendant's gun as the murder weapon.
7.

It is uncontroverted that on June 17,1984, prior to flying to Salt Lake

City, defendant called Patricia York and told her that if he found Mr. Longhurst within 50
feet of her, that defendant was going to come up and kill Longhurst. Defendant made
some reference to shooting Longhurst "like a dog."
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8.

When defendant arrived at police dispatch in Bountiful, the dispatcher

was on the 911 call with Anita York, who was giving the dispatcher information about the
shooting. While the dispatcher was still on the phone with Anita, defendant told the
dispatcher, Tm the man who did the shooting. I'm the man you are looking for."
9.

Subsequently, at the hospital, defendant asked several hospital

personnel if the victim was dead and stated that he (defendant) would no longer be a
member of the church and that he would go to hell.
10.

If defendant had elected to go to trial, his incriminating statements to

police and others, as well as several inconsistent statements, would have been admitted
into evidence.
11.

Defendant originally filed a notice of defense claiming that he was not

guilty by reason of insanity or that he had diminished mental capacity at the time the
offenses occurred. Accordingly, the trial court ordered that defendant be examined as to
his "mental condition" and appointed Doctors Chris Ghicadus and Heber C. Kimball of the
Davis County Health Department, to conduct the examination. Both doctors concluded
that defendant was not mentally ill.
12.

During the criminal proceedings, defendant was represented by

George Diumenti. By 1984 when he represented defendant, Mr. Diumenti was a seasoned
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defense attorney who had previously represented a client in a capital jury trial which
resulted in a non-death verdict.
13.

Prior to accepting defendant's case, Mr. Diumenti contacted the police

and the county attorney to determine the evidence supporting the charges. Mr. Diumenti
then discussed the case with his partner, Bill Lindsley. Mr. Diumentfs practice was to
double-team capital cases.
14.

Mr. Diumenti charges a flat rate in criminal cases. He discussed with

defendant a $15,000 fee for representing defendant in this case. Approximately one month
prior to the preliminary hearing, defendant paid Mr. Diumenti a $6,000 retainer from the
traveler's checks that he brought with him from California. Mr. Diumenti did not get
involved in debt collection issues, and throughout the remainder of his representation of
defendant, Mr. Diumenti was unaware whether defendant had an outstanding balance.
15.

Mr. Diumenti met with defendant several times and discussed all the

evidence and possible trial strategies. Mr. Diumenti regularly contacted defendant and
kept him informed of new factual or legal developments.
16.

At the evidentiary hearing, defendant recalled having seen many of

the police reports prior to trial.
17.

As a matter of general practice, Mr. Diumenti did not ask his clients

whether they committed the crime because then he would be unable to call his clients to
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testify on their own behalf, if necessary. Mr. Diumenti's practice was to review defense
scenarios with his clients to see if any were plausible.
18.

Mr. Diumenti discussed possible defenses with defendant and

researched the current law to determine a defense theory. Mr. Diumenti's primary concern
was to avoid the death penalty. Therefore, he did not want to pursue an implausible
defense that would undermine his credibility in front of a jury.
19.

Initially, Mr. Diumenti was planning to pursue a "heat of passion" type

defense based upon defendant's rage after learning that Jeff Longhurst was at Patricia
York's house.

However, defendant's claim of amnesia defeated this defense.

Mr.

Diumenti did not believe that defendant lacked memory of the crime because there was"
no independent evidence supporting it, and defendant claimed to remember some details
of the crime (e.g. a struggle with Jeff Longhurst), but not the actual shooting.
20.

In addition to the claim of amnesia, defendant informed Mr. Diumenti

of the following possible defenses: (a) that an unknown third person was the shooter; (b)
that Anita was the shooter; and (c) the Patricia York set up defendant for her own personal
gain. In light of the overwhelming evidence against defendant, Mr. Diumenti declined to
pursue defendant's suggested defenses. Mr. Diumenti felt that in order to maintain
credibility in front of a jury, he must believe in the defense theory. Defendant's alternative
theories were simply implausible.
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21.

Defendant claims that he had no memory of the shooting when he pled

guilty. This claim of amnesia is not credible given: (a) the details he offered to the police
and other personnel; (b) his conversations with Mr. Diumenti, and (c) defendant's testimony
at the evidentiary hearing regarding whether he had ever seen specific pages of numerous
police reports thirteen years ago. If defendant had presented an amnesia defense at trial,
a jury would almost certainly have drawn a conclusion of convenient amnesia which would
have devastated any kind of insanity defense, in addition to Mr. Diumenti's credibility with
the jury.
22.

After reading the reports of Dr. Ghicadusand Dr. Kimball, Mr. Diumenti

saw no basis for an insanity or diminished capacity defense. After full consideration of the
evidence, Mr. Diumenti made the strategic decision to forego further psychiatric testing of
defendant. Defendant acquiesced in the withdrawal of the insanity or diminished capacity
defense after Mr. Diumenti presented alternative theories and explained the ramifications
of withdrawing the defense.
23.

Defendant claims that Mr. Diumenti was deficient for failing to

investigate. The only additional evidence offered was the fact that Mr. Diumenti did not
conduct a comparison of the serial numbers on defendant's gun and the gun used in the
shooting. Mr. Diumenti's failure to research the serial numbers was not deficient, given the
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eyewitness to the shooting, defendant's confession, and Patricia York's identification of
petitioner's gun as the murder weapon.
24.

In Mr. Diumenti's opinion, the prosecutor's plea offer was very

reasonable. Mr. Diumenti fully explained to defendant the benefits and consequences of
pleading guilty. Mr. Diumenti discussed with defendant the elements of the offenses
charged in the amended information, and reviewed with defendant the statutory elements
and the evidence supporting them.
25.

Mr. Diumenti did not tell defendant to go along with the system in an

effort to induce defendant to plead guilty. If Mr. Diumenti used the phrase "go along with
the system" it was in reference to following institutional rules once in prison.
26.

Mr. Diumenti did not tell defendant that he (defendant) would go to the

state hospital if he pled guilty.
27.

Defendant made the ultimate decision whether to accept the plea offer,

and did not insist on going to trial.
28.

Mr. Diumenti informed defendant that Susan Wilson, prosecutor Mel

Wilson's1 wife, was the AP&P agent who would prepare defendant's presentence
investigation report. Mr. Diumenti made the strategic decision to have Ms. Wilson prepare

1

Although Mel Wilson had some involvement with the crime scene, he did not
handle the plea negotiations on behalf of the State. Bill McGuire was the prosecutor in
this matter.
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the report. Mr. Diumenti had known Ms. Wilson since 1970 and knew her to be openminded, accurate, and compassionate. In Mr. Diumenti's opinion, it was in defendant's
best interest to have Ms. Wilson conduct the presentence investigation. Defendant had
no objection to Ms. Wilson.
29.

Ms. Wilson included several mitigating statements in the presentence

report, and defendant has failed to identify any errors in the report.
30.

There is no evidence to support defendant's claim of a conflict of

interest based upon Mr. Diumenti allegedly turning over $14,000 in defense funds to an
undisclosed third person.
31.

The Court does not find the testimony of Mildreth Gilgen credible or

relevant.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Defendant's challenges to his competency to stand trial and to the trial

court's failure to hold a formal competency hearing have been previously litigated in York
v. Shulsen. 875 P.2d 590, 592 (Utah App. 1994). Accordingly, the Court declines to revisit
these issues here.
2.

In order to prevail on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,

defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that specific acts or omissions
fall outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance, and that counsel's
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deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of the proceeding. In order to demonstrate
prejudice in the context of a guilty plea, defendant must prove that absent counsel's errors,
defendant would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.
3.

Mr. Diumenti reasonably concluded that the plea offer was in

defendant's best interest, and did not coerce defendant to plead guilty. Defendant faced
a capital homicide conviction which was supported by the evidence. A jury could very well
have imposed the death penalty if the matter had gone to trial.
4.

Defendant has failed to prove any specific acts or omissions of Mr.

Diumenti which constitute deficient performance. Accordingly, there is no need to examine
the issue of prejudice.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Based on the foregoing, the Court denies defendant's motion to withdraw his
guilty pleas.
DATED this *(£*

day of

Acnrw-k*

1937.

BY THE COURT:

HONORABUE RODNEY S. PAGE
Second District Court
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Approved as to form:

jierold D. M c P h e e $ r ~Zc\r\y r n c^^oio
Attorney for defendant u>o c a t O^-^VJ- C C V ^ ^

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEAS was mailed, postage prepaid, this 7^\

day of October,

1997 to:
Jerold D. McPhee
Attorney for Defendant
336 S. 300 E., Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2505

(gUjJL/^. vUici^to
11

ADDENDUM

C

at 21 i:,,-. .„
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SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTSSTATE OF UTAH
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH ,
Plaintiff(s),

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW
GUILTY PLEA

vs.
Case No. 841704638
DONALD WILLIAM YORK,
Defendant(s).
Rodney S. Page, Judge
Comes now the Court and having review Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
and the Memorandum submitted in support thereof and the State's Memorandum and Exhibits
submitted in opposition thereto, and being fully advised in the premises, the Court hereby
rules as follows:
The defendant has previously filed numerous petitions for Habeas Corpus dating back
to April of 1985. The issues raised herein have all been raised in one form or another in
these prior petitions.
Although the matter here under consideration is a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, it
is considered as a post-judgment writ; and therefore, the law generally applicable to postjudgment writs is applicable to the matter here before the Court. In that regard, the law
generally bars issues which have been previously adjudicated or which could have been
adjudicated in a prior proceeding. An exception is made as to those issues where the
petitioner can show unusual circumstances or good cause.

A showing of good cause may be established by showing, among other things, the
existence of fundamental unfairness in a conviction.
In the matter here before the Court, the Court concludes that the issue of the failure to
conduct a competency hearing prior to plea and the issue of Defendant's competency at the
time his plea was entered have been previously adjudicated before the Third District Court
and the Court of Appeals, and there is no good cause or unusual circumstances which would
justify the Court in again looking at those issues. Therefore, the Court hereby denies those
basis for any motion to set aside a plea of guilty in this matter.
The Court concludes that the issues of ineffective assistance of counsel, counsel's
conflict of interest and the question of whether Defendant's plea was made knowingly and
voluntarily, if as alleged by the defendant do manifest a fundamental unfairness in the
conviction; and therefore constitute good cause to allow this Court to adjudicate those issues.
As to whether Defendant's plea was taken in accordance with State Statute and Case
Law in effect at the time, the Court has reviewed the transcript of Defendant's plea taken on
October 29, 1994. In reviewing the transcript as a whole, the Court concludes that the taking
of Defendant's plea substantially complied with the Statute and Case Law then in effect; and
therefore denies Defendant's Motion based on that argument.
As to the other issues bearing on the voluntariness of Defendant's plea, the claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel and counsel's conflict of interest, these matters will be set for
evidentiary hearing.

The Court will immediately set the matter on for pre-trial and notify counsel of the
date.
Defendant's counsel will prepare Findings and Judgment in accordance with the
Court's Ruling and submit the same to Plaintiffs counsel at least five days prior to the time it
is submitted to the Court for signature.
Dated this ^M^day of January, 1997.
By the Court:

District Courpuudge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I , the undersigned, do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing, Ruling, postage prepaid, to the following:
Ms. Angela F. Micklos
Assistant Attorney General
P.O. Box 140854
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-1854

Mr. Jerold D. McPhee
336 South 300 East Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2505

Mr. Carvel R. Harward
Deputy Davis County Attorney
800 West State Street
Farmington, Ut 84025

Dated this ^ 1 day of January, 1997.
&ut^<-<>
Clerk/ Deputy Clerk
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ADDENDUM

D

Jerold D. McPhee (3662)
Attorney for Uie Plaintiff
336 South 300 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2504
Telephone: (801) 322-1616
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY*
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 841704638 FS
vs.
Judge: Rodney S. Page

DONALD WILLIAM YORK,
Defendant.
STIPULATION

COMES NOW the parties in the above-entitled action, the State of Utah and the Defendant,
Donald William York, by and through their respective counsel, Ms. Angela F. Micklos, Assistant

[W i ^
J

Attorney General, and Jerold D. McPhee, herewith stipulate and agree as follo\*£: o^A fOs • vohn UCL
1.

That Ms. Mary Minick (Peterson) gave Mr. Diumenti a check for $14,000.00 dollars ^ . ^ Ji

for the Defendant's bail or defense.
2.

That the $14,000.00 dollar check was made payable to Ms. Mary Minick (Peterson).

3.

That Ms. Mary Minick (Peterson) told Mr. Diumenti that she would endorse the check

over to a bail bondsman as soon as she was informed of who the bail bondsman was to be?
4.

That Ms. Mary Minick (Peterson) was not called or consulted about releasing the

1-

,

Check to Mr. Dave Randall.
5.

That Ms. Mary Minick (Peterson) did not endorse the check over to anyone.

6.

It was Ms. Mary Minick's understanding that Mr. Diumenti would keep the check until

he found a bail bondsman.
7.

The Court can take judicial notice that when bail would have been available to the

Defendant, on or about June 24, 1984, or thereafter, a bail bondsman's fee was 10% of bail
^^c*

-/ u i
^C

y

8.

* * * * *

. A u ;>v*
***

The parties further stipulate and agree that Patricia Minick- YorkVas present when> offu^<X^\

Mr. Diumenti directed Chris York and Dave Randll to go to the crime scene and remove all
"evidence" possible and bring it back to Diumenti
DATED this

>'" day of August, 1997.

Jrfold D. McPhee
ttorney for Defendant

O^yL %

vKKcfafo^

Angela F. Micklos
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for the Plaintiff
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